We formalize the interplay between expected voting behavior and stragetic positioning behavior of candidates as a common agency problem in which the candidates (i.e., the principals) compete for voters (i.e., agents) via the issues they choose and the positions they take. A political situation is de…ned as a feasible combination of candidate positions and expected political payo¤s to the candidates. Taking this approach, we are led naturally to a particular formalization of the candidates' positioning game, called a political situation game. Within the context of this game, we de…ne the notion of farsighted stability (introduced in an abstract setting by Chwe (1994)) and apply Chwe's result to obtain existence of farsightedly stable outcomes. We compute the farsightedly stable sets for several examples of political situations games, with outcomes that conform to real-world observations.
Introduction

Overview
In an election, voters' preferences over candidates depend in part upon the positions taken by the candidates on the issues. In turn, the issues which emerge during the campaign and the positions taken by the candidates depend jointly on the electoral system in place, the expected voting behavior of the electorate, and the strategic positioning behavior of candidates. In this paper, we assume that the electoral system in place selects a winning candidate via a simple plurality rule, and we focus on the interplay between expected voting behavior and strategic positioning behavior of candidates. We formalize this interplay as a common agency problem in which the candidates (i.e., the principals) compete for voters (i.e., agents) via the issues they choose and the positions they take. A political situation is de…ned as a feasible combination of positions by the candidates and expected political payo¤s to the candidates. The framework naturally leads to a particular formalization of the candidates' positioning game, called a political situation game. Within the context of this game, we de…ne the notion of farsighted stability, introduced by Chwe (1994) in an abstract setting, and based on Chwe's existence result, show existence of farsightedly stable political situations.
Stated informally, a political situation is farsightedly stable if no candidates (acting individually or collusively) have incentives to alter their positions on issues (and hence possibly their political payo¤s) for fear that such alterations might induce further position changes (or deviations) by other candidates that, in the end, leave some or all of the initially deviating candidates in a political situation where they are not better o¤ -and perhaps worse o¤. The notion of farsighted stability captures, in a way not possible with the myopic Nash equilibrium notion, the farsighted nature of political strategizing and position taking by candidates in political campaigns. Moreover, unlike pure strategy Nash equilibria, farsightedly stable political situations always exist.
In order to illustrate the notion of farsighted stability within the context of a political situation game, we present several examples. In all of our examples, two candidates compete for a single political o¢ce in a campaign in which the candidates can take (or not take) positions on two issues. Also, we assume that each candidate's expected payo¤ is given by the candidate's relative expected voting share (i.e., the fraction of all votes caste, caste for the candidate), and we identify conditions on the primitives of the general model which rationalize this assumption (section 2.4). Informally, we wish to capture the idea that the candidates do care about their popularity even if they do not win the election, since the candidate, or his colleagues in the same political party, may also care about the end of the current election as the starting point from which they must campaign for the next election.
The simplicity of the examples allows us, in each case, to compute the farsightedly stable set of political situations. In all but one of the examples, no pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists, but in all the examples, the farsightedly stable set of political situations is nonempty. Moreover, in all but one of our examples, a single candidate emerges as the expected winner in all political situations contained in the farsightedly stable set. In these examples, the farsightedly stable set predicts a winner. However, in one example (the example corresponding to Table 5 below), the farsightedly stable set consists of two political situations. In one farsightedly stable political situation candidate 1 is the expected winner, while in the other farsightedly stable political situation, candidate 2 is the expected winner. Thus, in this example the election is too close to call in a strategic sense.
Related Literature In our model of voting (Section 2.2), voters are assumed to vote for a particular candidate (or abstain from voting) based on incentives created by the candidates' positions on the issues, without strategic regard for how their vote might in ‡uence the outcome of the election as expressed via pivot probabilities. In this sense, our paper is related to the literature on spatial voting (Hotelling 1929 , Downs 1957 , and Enelow and Hinich 1990 -see Mueller 1989 for an overview) and the various extensions of spatial voting to probabilistic voting theory (see, for example, Coughlin 1992 and Lin, Enelow, and Dorussen 1999) -rather than the literature on strategic voting and the seminal work of Ledyard (1984) , Myerson and Weber (1993) , and Myerson (1998). 1 However, the essential details of our model of voter preferences and voter choice are more in the tradition of the principal-agent literature rather than in the tradition of the spatial and probabilistic voting literature. Notably, unlike the case in spatial voting models, our descriptions of candidates' positions can be quite general and are not required to be representable as points on a line or points in the plane. We think of candidates' positions as playing the role of contracts which, along with the voter's type and the state of nature, determine the voter's incentives for a subsequent action choice -the choice a particular candidate as expressed via the act of voting. Thus, in our model the candidates acting as the principals compete for voters via the positions they take on the issues (i.e., via the positions they o¤er to the electorate).
In our model of the candidates' positioning game, farsighted stability replaces the Nash equilibrium notion found in, say, Osborne (1993) and McKelvey and Patty (1999) . Our move away from the Nash equilibrium notion to the notion of farsighted stability, as well as our move from spatial-type positioning games to political situation games have several advantages, especially in modeling elections with more than two candidates.
For example, within the context of a spatial-type positioning game, Osborne (1993) …nds that in elections involving more than two candidates, if each potential candidate has an option of not entering the campaign rather than to enter and lose, then for almost any distribution of the voters' ideal points (i.e., most preferred positions) the candidates' positioning game has no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Osborne (1993) also …nds that if each potential candidate prefers to enter and lose rather than to stay out of the campaign and chooses a position to maximize his plurality, then the game has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium for almost any singlepeaked distribution over voters' ideal points. No such nonexistence problem arises for the farsightedly stable set of a political situation game: for any political situation game in which candidates' can choose from …nitely many positions on each of …nitely many issues, the farsightedly stable set of political situations is always nonempty.
The intuition behind the absence of nonexistence problems in the case of farsighted stability in political situation games can be summarized as follows: because candidates preferences over political situations are naturally irre ‡exive (see Section 3.1) and because only …nitely many political situations are possible, in…nite chains of farsightedly preferred political situations cannot occur -and as a result, the set of farsightedly stable political situations is nonempty. In the case of Nash equilibrium, unless we are willing to allow mixed positioning strategies, even in …nite, two candidate games, Nash equilibrium may fail to exist. Farsighted stability has another advantage. As noted by Osborne (1993) , the Nash equilibrium notion of the simultaneous move candidates' positioning game fails to capture the strategic reasoning of candidates competing in a political race. Farsighted stability provides one way in which such strategic reasoning can be captured in the equilibrium notion.
To further position our research in the literature, we remark that unlike recent work by Besley and Coate (1997) and Osborne and Slivinski (1996) , the set of candidates is not endogenous. One possibility we allow, however, is that a candidate may take the position "No position" on every issue. (There is no guarantee, however, that a candidate following this strategy would not win the election.) 
Issues and Positions
Consider an election in which K candidates compete for a single political o¢ce. In the campaign, there are potentially M issues about which candidates can di¤er in their positions. We shall assume that, (A-1) for each of …nitely many issues, there is a …nite number of positions that can be taken by the candidates including the position, "no position." Moreover, the set of possible positions on each issue is known to all candidates and voters.
The notion of a position can be broadly interpreted. For example, a candidate's position on the issue of gun control might be de…ned by a position statement (for example, that the private ownership of automatic and semi-automatic hand guns be strictly forbidden) as well as by a parameter measuring the intensity with which the candidate advertises his stated position. Thus, two candidates may have similar position statements (or messages) on a particular issue, but di¤er in their positions because they di¤er in the intensity with which they advertise their positions. Alternatively, a candidate may choose to take no position on a particular issue by choosing not to make and/or advertise his position statement. If both candidates choose not to take a position on an issue, then the issue is absent from the campaign. In this way campaign competition determines the issues in the campaign.
Negative advertising can also be captured by the notion of a candidate's position. For example, the list of campaign issues might include the issue of the character of a candidate's opponent, with the list of possible positions on the character issue including the position statement "go negative" along with a parameter measuring the intensity with which the candidate's negative advertising campaign against his opponent is carried out. Let I i := the …nite set of all possible positions that can be taken on issue i = 1; 2; : : : ; M; and let
We shall denote by 0 the position, "no position." Thus, for each issue i; the set of possible positions I i includes the position 0, indicating that no position is being taken.
Each candidate k = 1; 2; : : : ; K can be described by the position type , p k = (p k1 ; : : : ; p kM ) 2 P , chosen by the candidate, that is, by the M ¡ tuple of positions taken by the candidate. Thus, p ki 2 I i denotes the position taken by the k th candidate on issue i.
Let
P := P £ ¢ ¢ ¢ £ P denote the K-fold Cartesian product of P . We shall refer to the set P as the set of position pro…les and we shall denote by p := (p 1 ; p 2 ; : : : ; p K ) 2 P £ ¢ ¢ ¢ £ P := P a typical element of P. We shall assume that (A-2) each candidate k (= 1; 2; : : : ; K) is constrained to choose his position type from some subset P k of P . Moreover, for k = 1; 2; : : : ; K; the position constraint set P k is known to all candidates and voters.
We shall denote by P c the k -fold Cartesian product of the P k : Thus,
Choice and Voter Preferences
The voter's choice set is given by V = f0; 1; 2; : : : ; K g, be the utility function corresponding to a type t 2 T voter given state of nature z 2 Z and position pro…le p 2 P. We shall maintain the following assumptions throughout:
(A-3) Voter types are drawn from a probability space (T; §; ¹) and this probability space is known by all candidates. Here T is an arbitrary set equipped with ¾-…eld § and ¹ is probability measure de…ned on §. (A-4) States of nature are drawn from a probability space (Z; z;¸) and this probability space is known by all candidates. Here Z is an arbitrary set equipped with ¾-…eld z and¸is probability measure de…ned on z.
(A-5) States of nature and voter types are stochastically independent.
(A-6) At the time the voter makes his choice (i.e., castes his vote), the voter knows his type, the state of nature, and the position of each candidate.
(A-7) The utility function The voter's choice problem can now be stated formally as follows:
Because the voter can choose to abstain from voting by choosing v = 0, political participation is endogenous. For each (t; z; p) 2 T £ Z £ P the voter's choice problem (2) has a solution. Let
and
The function u ¤ (t; z; ¢) : P ! R gives a type t voter's optimal level of utility as a function of position pro…les given state of nature z. Thus, u ¤ (t; z; ¢) expresses a type t voter's preferences over the set of position pro…les P given state of nature z. The set-valued mapping
gives a type t voter's best responses as a function of the state of nature and the position pro…le. For each voter type t 2 T , each state of nature z 2 Z, and each position pro…le p 2 P, ©(t; z; p) is a nonempty subset of V .
Note that in a two candidate election (i.e., V = f0; 1; 2g), assumption (A-8) implies that for each (t; z; p) 2 T £ Z £ P, ©(t; z; p) = fvg for some v 2 V . Thus, in a two candidate election, (A-8) implies that for each (t; z; p) 2 T £ Z £ P; ©(t; z; p) is single-valued.
Election Mechanisms and Expected Voter Turnout
Given position pro…le p = (p 1 ; : : : ; p K ) 2 P, an election mechanism is a mapping from voter types and states of nature into the voter's choice set that speci…es for each voter type and state of nature the voter's optimal candidate choice. Formally, an election mechanism is a § £ z-measurable function º p (¢; ¢) :
Here, § £ z denotes the product ¾-…eld generated by the ¾-…elds § and z. 5 Note that, if given the voter's type and the state of nature, the voter is indi¤erent between two or more candidates, the election mechanism speci…es how the tie will be broken.
We shall denote by¨( p) the set of all election mechanisms given position pro…le p 2 P: Under assumptions (A-1)-(A-7),¨(p) is nonempty for each position pro…le p 2 P. Moreover, if assumption (A-8) is added, then in a two candidate election
represents the k th candidate's expected voter share, while the expression
represents the corresponding expected voter turnout. 6 We shall assume that (A-9) the set of feasible position pro…les P c is such that for each p 2 P c and each
, that is we shall assume that P c is such that expected voter turnout is positive.
Candidates' Expected Payo¤ Functions
The k th candidate's payo¤ function is given by,
We shall maintain the following assumption throughout:
(A-10) For k = 1; 2; : : : ; K; the payo¤ function g k (¢; ¢; ¢; ¢) : T £Z £P£V ! R is such that for each position pro…le p 2 P and each election mechanism, º p (¢; ¢) 2¨(p),
is § £ z-measurable and ¹ £¸-integrable. 7 6 Thus, for k = 0;
is the expected share of voters not voting, where ¹ £¸denotes the product measure de…ned on the product ¾-…eld, § £ z. 7 The function (t; z) ! g k (t; z; p; º p (t; z)) is § £ z-measurable if given any real number g, the set
is …nite.
Given position pro…le p 2 P c and election mechanism º p (¢; ¢) 2¨(p), the k th candidate's expected payo¤ is
One possible speci…cation for a candidate's expected payo¤ is relative expected voter share(REVS) given by
, k = 1; 2; : : : ; K:
By assumption (A-9), REVS is well-de…ned. Moreover, if all that matters to a candidate is his expected voter share relative to other candidates; then assuming that each candidate's expected payo¤ is given by REVS is appealing. Note that a candidate, in considering a particular change in position, must take into account the possibility that while the contemplated change may induce some abstaining voters to enter and vote for him; it may also induce other voters to enter and vote for other candidates. By taking as the candidate's expected payo¤ relative expected voter share, this possibility is measured and taken into account. A simple form for each candidate's payo¤ function will ensure that expected payo¤s will satisfy REVS. 8 Suppose the k th candidate's payo¤ function is given by
Then, given position pro…le p 2 P c and election mechanism º p (¢; ¢) 2¨(p); we have for each candidate k = 1; 2; : : : ; K
T(ºp(¢;¢)) :
Election Mechanisms, Position Pro…les, and Political Situations
Each candidate's expected payo¤ is determined by the positions chosen by the other candidates as well as by the election mechanism that emerges as a result of the optimizing behavior of voters. 
We shall denote by
the set of all political situations. 
Strategic Positioning Games and Farsightedly Stable Political Situations
Consider two political situations,
S a nonempty subset of N := f1; 2; : : : ; Kg.
From the perspective of candidates k 2 S, political situation (¼ 1 ; p 1 ) is preferred to political situation (¼ 0 ; p 0 ): Three questions now arise: (i) Is it within the power of candidates k 2 S acting collusively or acting independently to change the political situation from (¼ 0 ; p 0 ) to (¼ 1 ; p 1 ) by changing their political positions? (ii) Will such a change trigger further position changes, and thus further changes in expected payo¤s, that leave some or all candidates k 2 S not better o¤ and possibly worse o¤? (iii) Is there a political situation which is stable in the sense that no candidate or subset of candidates has incentives to change their positions for fear that such changes might trigger a sequence of changes which makes the initially deviating candidates not better o¤ and possibly worse o¤? These are the questions we now address.
Credible Improvements in Political Situations
We begin with some de…nitions. Throughout we shall denote by S a nonempty subset of N := f1; 2; : : : ; Kg: De…nition 2 (Credible Change and Improvement) Let (¼ 0 ; p 0 ) and (¼ 1 ; p 1 ) be two political situations (i.e., pairs contained in P), and let S µ N.
(1) (Credibly Change) We say that candidates k 2 S can credibly change the political situation from (¼ 
Farsightedly Stable Political Situations
Again we begin with a de…nition.
De…nition 3 (Farsighted Stability) A subset F of political situations is said to be farsightedly stable if for each political situation (¼ 0 ; p 0 ) 2 F the following is true: given any (
A subset F ¤ of political situations is said to be the largest farsightedly stable set if for any farsightedly stable set F it is true that F µ F ¤ .
In words, a set F of political situations is farsightedly stable, if given any political situation (¼ 0 ; p 0 ) in F and any credible S-deviation to political situation (
is not an S -improvement over (¼ 0 ; p 0 ). Thus, F is farsightedly stable if, given any political situation (¼ 0 ; p 0 ) in F; any credible S -deviation to another political situation (¼ 1 ; p 1 ) in P carries with it the possibility of further credible deviations which end in a political situation that is not preferred. That is, credible deviations may continue and reach a political situation (¼ 2 ; p 2 ) 2 F in which all or some of the initially deviating candidates in S are not better o¤ and are possibly worse o¤. 10 9 Thus, for candidates k 2 S n , the expected political payo¤ in intermediate political situations (i.e., situations prior to the ending situation) may be less than the expected political payo¤ in the situation (¼ n¡1 ; p n ¡1 ) that candidates k 2 S n changed. 10 In Chwe (1994) a farsightedly stable set F is called a consistent set.
Political Situation Games
We may think of the set of political situations P equipped with binary relation BB as describing a political situation game. We say that a political situation (¼ ¤ ; p ¤ ) 2 P is an equilibrium of the game (P; BB) if (¼ ¤ ; p ¤ ) is contained in the largest farsightedly stable set, that is, if
Chwe (1994) has shown that for all games, such as political situation games, (P; BB), there exists a unique, largest farsightedly stable set (see Chwe (1994) , Proposition 1). However, like the core, the largest farsightedly stable set F ¤ may be empty. What guarantees that F ¤ 6 = ;?
Theorem 1 (Nonemptiness of F ¤ for political situation games (P; BB)) Suppose assumptions (A-1)-(A-7) and (A-10) hold. The political situation game (P; BB) has a nonempty, unique, largest farsightedly stable set F
Proof. First, recall that under assumptions (A-1)-(A-7) and (A-10), the set of political situations P is nonempty and …nite. Second, note that for all S µ N, the relation Â S de…ned on P is irre ‡exive (i.e., for all (¼; p) 2 P, (¼; p)¨S (¼; p)). 
Examples: Two Candidate, Two Issue Elections
Consider an election model satisfying assumptions (A-1)-(A-9) in which two candidates compete for a single o¢ce and assume that for each possible position pro…le p 2 P c , the k th candidate's expected payo¤ is given by
relative expected voter share (REVS). Recall that under assumption (A-8), in a two candidate race the election mechanism, º p (¢; ¢) 2¨(p), is unique. Moreover, given assumption (A-9), assumption (A-10) holds automatically.
Suppose now that in the campaign, there are two issues:
(1) the character of the opponent, (2) the environment, and in particualr global warming.
On issue (1), the character issue, there are two positions,
Here, ¡1 indicates that the candidate is going negative with regard to his position on his opponent's character.
11
On issue (2), the issue of global warming, there are three positions,
Here, ¡1 indicates that the candidate is taking the position (the negative position) that, thus far, the scienti…c evidence does not indicate that global warming is a serious problem, and that to the extent that it is a problem, the solution is best left to the market place to work out. Alternatively, +1 indicates that the candidate is taking the position (the positive position) that global warming is a serious problem, that an international body should be established to monitor green house gases, and that an international pollution voucher market should be established. For candidate 1, the following positions are possible:
While for candidate 2, the following positions are possible:
Note that on the issue of global warming candidate 1 is constrained to take either no position or a positive position, while candidate 2 is constrained to take either no position or a negative position. We can summarize the candidates' possible position types via the following table:
Changes 11 Recall that 0 indicates that no position is being taken.
As we move from northwest to southeast in Table 1 , candidates' position types move from purely substantive types (taking positions on the substantive issue of global warming) to purely negative types (taking positions only on the character issue). For example, in cell 1; 1 of the table, the position pro…le is given by (p 1 ; p 2 ) = ((0; +1); (0; ¡1));
indicating that candidates are taking opposing positions on global warming, while taking no positions on the character issue. Alternatively, in cell 3; 3 of the table, the campaign's position pro…le is (p 1 ; p 2 ) = ((¡1; 0); (¡1; 0));
indicating that candidates are taking no positions on global warming, while taking negative positions on the character issue. Thus, the position pro…le has moved from substantive positions to nonsubstantive positions on the character issue.
Position Pro…les and Expected Voter Shares
Which position pro…les in the table are farsightedly stable? This depends on the demographics summarizing the outcomes (i.e., expected voter shares) generated by the underlying unique election mechanism. Table 2 below summarizes the demographics. 12 The upper portion of each cell in Table 2 consists of a 3-tuple, while the lower portion of each cell gives candidates' corresponding position pro…le. The …rst entry in the 3-tuple is candidate 1's expected voter share, while the second entry is candidate 2's expected share. The third entry is the expected voter share abstaining from participation (i.e., not voting) in the election. Thus, for example cell 2; 3 in the Table 2 , given by (:254; :246; :50) ((¡1; +1); (¡1; 0)) 2;3 indicates that the voter shares corresponding to position pro…le ((¡1; +1); (¡1; 0)) are 25:4% for candidate 1; 24:6% for candidate 2; and 50% not voting. Table 3 below contains all possible political situations and is constructed from the information in the demographics table, Table 2 . For example, cell 2; 3 in Table 3 , given by (:51; :49) ((¡1; +1); (¡1; 0)) 2;3 contains, in the upper portion, the 2-tuple (:51; :49) of relative expected voter shares for candidates 1 and 2, and in the lower portion, the position pro…le (p 1 ; p 2 ) = ((¡1; +1); (¡1; 0)):
Thus, if candidate 1 takes positions (¡1; +1) on the issues, while candidate 2 takes positions (¡1; 0), then of the expected voter turnout of 50% (= 25:4% + 24:6%, see Table 2 ), 51% are expected to vote for candidate 1, while 49% are expected to vote for candidate 2: 13 Thus, if candidates' position pro…le is (p 1 ; p 2 ) = ((¡1; +1); (¡1; 0)), then candidate 1 is expected to win the election, carrying 51% of the voter turnout to candidate 2's 49%. Thus, cell 2; 3 of Table 3 Let 2 P denote the collection of all subsets of P (including the empty set), and de…ne the mapping
as follows:
given a subset of political situations H 2 2
can be undone by a sequence of credible moves to some other political situation (¼ 2 ; p 2 ) 2 H where some candidates j 2 S are not better o¤. As has been shown by Chwe (1994) , a subset F ¤ of P is the unique, largest farsightedly stable set if and only if F ¤ is a …xed point of the mapping ¤ P (¢) (i.e., if and only if F ¤ = ¤ P (F ¤ )): Because the mapping ¤ P (¢) is isotonic, that is, because H µ H 0 implies ¤ P (H) µ ¤ P (H 0 ), the mapping ¤ P (¢) has a …xed point -but it may be empty. Here, however, since the relation Â S de…ned on P is irre ‡exive (i.e., (¼; p)¨S (¼; p) for nonempty S µ N and (¼; p) 2 P), and since the set of political situations P is …nite, it follows immediately from the Corollary to Proposition 2 in Chwe (1994) that F ¤ is nonempty. More importantly, F ¤ can be computed by iteratively applying the mapping ¤ P (¢) as follows: step 1, compute ¤ P (P); step 2, compute ¤ P (¤ P (P)); step 3, compute ¤ P (¤ P (¤ P (P))) ; . . . ; etc. Since P is …nite, for some …nite n; ¤ n P (P) = ¤ n+k P (P) for all k = 1; 2; : : : :
14 : Thus,
Applying the mapping ¤ P (¢) to the entries in Table 3 , we obtain after one iteration ¤ P ( Table 3 In the expression above, the political situations missing from the table on the right hand side are those that are indirectly dominated (i.e., BB-dominated), and therefore those that are not candidates for membership in the farsightedly stable set. Thus, in this example, the farsightedly stable set is given by 
Other Possibilities
Suppose now that the underlying demographics are such that the resulting table of political situations is given by Table 4 Here candidate 2, rather than candidate 1, has a dominate strategy given by position type p 2 = (0; ¡1). Note also that there is no Nash equilibrium position pro…le. Computing the farsightedly stable set, we obtain after one application of the mapping ¤ P (¢) to Table 4 Note that in both the farsightedly stable political situations above, candidate 2 is expected to win. Thus, in this example, the farsightedly stable set predicts a win by candidate 2. This prediction is hardly surprising given that candidate 2 has a dominate strategy (i.e., position type p 2 = (0; ¡1)). What is surprising, is that in farsightedly stable situation (¼; p) = ((:45; :55); ((¡1; 0); (¡1; ¡1))); candidate 2 chooses position type p 2 = (¡1; ¡1)¡ not a dominate strategy. However, because the largest farsightedly stable set is externally stable, candidate 1 can never turn this seemingly bad choice (i.e., p 2 = (¡1; ¡1)) by candidate 2 to his advantage. In the end, candidate 2 can always move the political situation back to one that is farsightedly stable -and therefore one in which he (candidate 2) is the expected winner. Does the largest farsightedly stable set always choose one particular candidate as the expected winner in all farsightedly stable political situations (i.e., does the largest farsightedly stable set always predict a winner) -even in the absence of a dominate strategy or a Nash equilibrium? 15 As our next two examples illustrate, no general conclusions can be drawn. Some elections are simply strategically too close to call. While in others, even elections in which no candidate has a dominate strategy, the largest farsightedly stable set does seem to predict a winner.
First, consider the "too-close-to-call" case. Table 5 below summarizes the political situations.
Changes in 1's Positions l Changes in 2's Positions $ mapping ¤ P (¢) the following: ¤ P (Table 5 Table 4 , the farsightedly stable set consists of two political situations, But now there is no agreement as to the expected winner. In farsightedly stable political situation ((:45; :55); ((¡1; 0); (¡1; ¡1))); candidate 2 is the expected winner, while in farsightedly stable political situation ((:51; :49); ((¡1; +1); (¡1; 0))); candidate 1 is the expected winner. In our …nal example, again no candidate has a dominate strategy and no Nash equilibrium exists, but the farsightedly stable set does predict a winner. Consider the political situations given in Table 6 below. Applying the mapping ¤ P (¢) to Table 6 , after one iteration we have the following:
¤ P (Table 6 Again applying the mapping ¤ P (¢); we obtain ¤ P (¤ P ( Table 6) in which candidate 2 is the expected winner.
